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Fifth Canadian Armoured Division: 
Introduction to Battle 
Bill McAndrew 
T he Canadian government authorized the formation of lst Canadian Armoured 
Division (CAD) early in 1941. It organized at 
Camp Borden in March and, redesignated 5th 
CAD, sailed for the United Kingdom in the fall. 1 
Originally its organization was based on two 
armoured brigades (each of three regiments, a 
motor battalion and a support group composed 
of a field regiment, a Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA) 
regiment, an anti-tank regiment and an infantry 
battalion). In light of operational experience 
with armour in North Mrica the organization 
was subsequently changed; an armoured 
brigade was changed for one of infantry (three 
battalions), and the support group was modified 
to include two field regiments (one self-
propelled) along with the anti -aircraft and anti-
tank units. In addition, there were a motor 
battalion of infantry, a reconnaissance 
regiment, two Royal Canadian Engineer (RCE) 
squadrons and the usual support and 
administrative units. Once this phase of the 
division's reorganization was completed, 5th 
CAD's two brigades were 5 Canadian Armoured 
Brigade (CAB) (the Strathconas, British 
Columbia Dragoons, the 8th New Brunswick 
Hussars and the Westminster Regiment as a 
motorized infantry battalion), and ll Canadian 
Infantry Brigade (CIB) (The Perth Regiment, 
the Cape Breton Highlanders and the Irish 
Regiment of Canada). The Governor General's 
Horse Guards formed the reconnaissance 
regiment, and artillery support came from the 
17th Field, 8th Field (Self-Propelled), 4th Anti-
Tank and 5th LAA Regiments. 
Equipping the division was a slow, drawn 
out process. By the end of July 1942, 5 CAB 
had received only 40 per cent of its tanks, a 
motley mixture of American General Lees and 
Stuarts, along with a few Canadian-built Rams 
which were to be the formation's main battle 
tank. Not for another year were sufficient 
Rams available to fill the divisional 
establishment and, as a result, training 
suffered. Individual and specialist training 
went on continuously, and some troop 
movement and range practice was possible, 
but the division itself did not take to the field 
until it participated in the Army-level Exercise 
"Spartan" in February-March 1943. 
Mterwards, units were introduced to infantry-
tank cooperation drills, but little emphasis 
seems to have been given the topic, and while 
the pace of training picked up it was 
intermittent. The division's operational 
readiness remained questionable. 2 
The division was initially to participate in 
the campaign then being planned for North-
west Europe. Within a month of the l st 
Canadian Infantry Division's landing in Sicily 
in July 1943, however, the Canadian 
government proposed to the British Chiefs of 
Staff that a second division along with a 
Canadian Corps Headquarters be sent to the 
Mediterranean for battle experience. The British 
were at first reluctant but after considerable 
negotiation agreed to switch their 30 Corps 
Headquarters with l Canadian, and the 7th 
(Desert Rats) Armoured Division with 5th CAD. 
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5th Canadia,n Armoured Division 
Ang1l~tl944 
Major-General G. G. Simonds (1 Nov 1943 to 29 Jan 1944) 
Major-General E.L.M. Burns (30 Jan 1944 to 19 March 1944) 
Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister (20 March 1944 to 6 June 1945) 
5 Armoured Brigade 11 Infantry Brigade 12 Infantry Brigade 
2nd Armoured Regiment 
(Lord Strathcona's Horse 
(Royal Canadians)) 
11th Independent Machine Gun 
Company 
12th Independent Machine 
Gun Company 
(The Princess Louise Fusiliers) (The Princess Louise Fusiliers) 
5th Armoured Regiment 
(8th Princess Louise's 
(New Brunswick) Hussars) 
The Perth Regiment 4th Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards 
The Cape Breton Highlanders 
9th Armoured Regiment 
(The British Columbia 
Dragoons) 
The Irish Regiment 
The Lanark and Renfrew 
Scottish Regiment 
The Westminster Regiment 
(Motor) 
Divisional Troops 
3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment 
(The Governor General's Horse Guard) 
1st, lOth Field & 4th Field Park Squadrons, RCE 
The units sailed in November, some to North 
Africa, others direct to Italy, and by the end 
year were being concentrated, equipped and 
acclimated before being assigned operational 
responsibilities. 3 
As had been the case in Britain, equipment 
shortages hampered training and delayed the 
operational deployment of the division. Fifth 
CAD left its Ram tanks in England for 7th 
Armoured in exchange for the heavier-gunned 
Shermans which were now standard in the 
Mediterranean. General Guy Simonds, its new 
General Officer Commanding (GOC). decided 
to await the arrival in Italy of newer gasoline-
powered models to replace older diesel 
Shermans, and the rest of the Desert Rats 
vehicles were found to be well beyond their 
useful mechanical lives. Replacements arrived 
slowly. By the end of the year, for instance, the 
British Columbia Dragoons had obtained 87 
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17th Field, 8th Field (Self-Propelled), 4th Anti-
Tank and 5th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments, RCA 
5th Armoured Divisional Signals 
wheeled vehicles, including some Daimler and 
White scout cars, but no tanks at all. In 
February, 11 Honey reconnaissance tanks 
(stripped down Stuarts) were issued and soon 
after the first Shermans appeared, allowing 
crews finally to familiarize themselves with 
their new weapons. 4 
Meanwhile units were introduced to 
operations piecemeal. Not long after their 
arrival in Italy, sappers from 10 Field Squadron 
were committed to construct a bridge over a 
tributary of the Sangro River in support of the 
2nd New Zealand Division. Despite the 
inadequacies of their inherited vehicles and 
equipment, the squadron was able to complete 
a high level crossing in a week and then 
remained in the sector on maintenance and 
mine clearing tasks until the end of the year. 
The other squadron, No. 1, was also called 
forward and obtained its first experience 
2
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Troops of the Cape Breton Highlanders being piped of{ the ship 
upon their arrival in Italy. 8 November 1943. (NAC) 
clearing mines under fire while supporting 1st 
Canadian Armoured Brigade, which had 
accompanied 1st Division to the Mediterranean 
earlier in the year. 
The infantry's introduction to actual 
operations was less auspicious. In December, 
Simonds, impressed that 11 Brigade was 
"steaming ahead," asked that it be sent forward 
by the end of the month "to get its first 
experience of contact with the enemy."5 Early 
in January 1944 it was placed under command 
of 1st Division and relieved its 3 Brigade in the 
line along the Arielli River north of Ortona. At 
this time the Adriatic front had stabilized into 
fixed winter lines. The Allied High Command 
was preparing major offensives at Cassino and 
Anzio and wished to prevent the Germans from 
reinforcing those fronts. Eleven Brigade was 
thus ordered to mount a limited holding attack 
across the Arielli to maintain pressure. Its 
assault on 17 January- successively by the 
Perths and the Cape Bretons, each with a 
squadron of tanks - went in across open 
ground in daylight against well-prepared river-
line defences manned by experienced veterans 
of the German 1st Parachute Division. The 
combination of a disjointed plan, inexperienced 
units and strong defences produced a dismal 
failure. None of the objectives were secured. 
45 
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The cost of the operation was eight officer and 
177 other rank casualties, which prompted 
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German 
Commander-in-Chief, to comment, 'The trial 
runs of green troops are nothing famous." 6 
Its morale down, 11 Brigade was quickly 
withdrawn from the line to recover. Three days 
later it was placed under command of the 4th 
Indian Division (along with the Strathconas 
and Westminsters) and assigned a fairly quiet 
sector of the defensive line. It was still in this 
position in early February when 5th CAD HQ 
relieved the Indians and assumed its first 
operational role. Then, as part of a general 
regrouping, the division shifted eastward to 
join 1st Division under command of the 
Canadian Corps. 7 
The division's preparation for active 
operations had been somewhat less than 
complete. It did not have an opportunity to 
function as a formation since its arrival in 
Italy, and equipment shortages severely limited 
unit training. Further, there was a notable 
lack of continuity in its command and staff 
structure during these first few months in the 
Mediterranean. At the end of 1943 General 
Simonds returned to the United Kingdom to be 
replaced by Major-General E.L.M. Burns. In 
March, Burns succeeded General Crerar as 
Corps Commander and Brigadier B.M. 
Hoffmeister became 5th CAD's third 
commander in as many months. In the same 
period both 5 Armoured and 11 Infantry 
Brigades received new Brigadiers, and at 
divisional headquarters a new CRA 
[Commander, Royal Artillery] (Brigadier H.A. 
Sparling). GSO I [General Staff Officer I] and 
AA&QMG [Assistant Adjutant and 
Quartermaster General] took up their duties. 8 
In noting the army historian's view that the 
division "still had something to learn about 
armour in battle," Burns commented later that 
"This was a considerable understatement, as I 
think most of the officers and men who arrived 
at the fighting front in the winter of 1943-44 
would agree. "9 
By the time the Canadian Corps became 
operational in February 1944, the character of 
the Italian campaign had changed markedly. 
The Allies had been able to advance rapidly 
46 
through Sicily and southern Italy- Fifth (US) 
Army in the west, Eighth (BR) Army to the east 
- but then were stopped on a line stretched 
across the country south of Rome by a 
combination of determined resistance and 
winter mud. In mid-January the first of a 
number of bitter attempts to unhinge the 
German defences foundered at Cassino, and a 
month later the enemy successfully contained 
Fifth Army's attempt to outflank their positions 
with an amphibious landing at Anzio. Field 
Marshal Harold Alexander, Commander of the 
18th Army Group, therefore, decided to call a 
halt to his offensive operations in order to 
prepare a full scale assault in the spring to 
destroy the German army south of Rome and 
liberate the capital. As it eventually matured, 
his plan called for a two-pronged attack. Fifth 
and Eighth Armies would break through from 
the South-east, the former along the coast and 
through the mountains, the latter driving 
through the valley of the Liri River, the 
traditional, relatively open, main route to Rome. 
Then, when the German commander had been 
forced to commit his reserves, the Allied forces 
at Anzio would break out, meet the others and 
isolate the defenders. 10 
There were few commanding precedents to 
guide planning for the coming offensive. Until 
then, for the most part, fighting in Sicily and 
Italy had been from the line of march in an 
extended advance to contact against continual 
delaying actions. Now, with the front stabilized, 
a major set-piece attack was needed to loosen 
it up once more. Eighth Army had had 
considerable experience with set-piece attacks, 
of course, but over terrain significantly different 
than the Italian where a succession of rivers, 
defiles and mountains ran across the grain of 
the advance, restricting movement and 
reinforcing the natural superiority of the 
defence. When Crerar and Burns first saw the 
winter lines they were reminded more of the 
Western Front they had known a generation 
earlier than of North Africa, and both were 
convinced that, lacking room for manoeuvre, 
massive firepower on the First World War 
model would be required to break the stalemate. 
Thus, while the tactical principles for the 
forthcoming attack were not new, there was a 
need to rethink them and determine how best 
they might be applied in the circumstances. 
4
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A Shennan tank of the Second Annoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona's Horse (RC)). 
Following that the troops, units and formations 
had to be trained to execute them. 
The Canadian Corps undertook a concerted 
training programme in the spring to prepare 
for the resumption of mobile warfare. Army, 
Corps and Divisional schools were opened for 
all manner of specialist and unit training. 
Sappers gave instruction in assault river 
crossing, mine clearing and pioneer work; 
gunners fired on impromptu ranges and many 
attended the Eighth Army School of Artillery; 
units sent cadres for muleteer and mountain 
fighting courses; armoured units did range 
firing, and infantry units tried to shed the 
mould accumulated after a lengthy period in 
trenches. While lst Division remained in the 
line its brigades rotated through reserve and 
training periods. When Hoffmeister assumed 
command of 5th CAD it was already in reserve; 
he stepped up the training pace, emphasizing 
particularly the need for all-arms cooperation. 11 
(LdSH(RC) Museum) 
Unfamiliarity with the strengths and 
limitations of other arms and services was 
perhaps the most common of training 
weaknesses. Eleven Brigade'sArielli operation 
had revealed one aspect of the problem, when 
the reluctance of forward infantry companies 
to "lean on" their artillery support allowed the 
German defenders to man their positions and 
inflict serious casualties. To counter this, 
Hoffmeister and his staff quickly organized a 
series of unit live firing exercises, on which the 
GOC insisted on accompanying the lead 
platoons to demonstrate how close troops can 
safely follow their supporting gunfire. 12 
The most effective means of employing 
armour, and the coordination of tank and 
infantry fire and movement, was the other 
principal concern. Before Burns left England 
for Italy, Montgomery had told him that "There 
is no role for an armoured division in Italy." 
But it was there, and he at the corps level and 
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Hoffmeister at the divisional level had to make 
do as best they could to adapt prevailing 
doctrine to their peculiar circumstances. That 
doctrine, laid down in the manual The Tactical 
Handling of the Armoured Division, had not 
been written with Italy in mind. 13 The armoured 
division was intended as "a mounted hard-
hitting formation primarily constituted for use 
against hastily prepared enemy defences, for 
exploitation of initial success gained by other 
armoured force. For maximum effect, the 
armoured division needed room for manoeuvre, 
and "Its full power will only be exerted by the 
employment of its armour concentrated, and 
supported by all the other components of the 
division." 15 Then, "By envelopment, or by deep 
penetration through (the enemy's) defences 
after a gap has been made in his main position 
by other formations," 16 the armoured division 
could become the "Expanding Torrent" 
Scout Cars in Harbour. 
Daimlers of the Fifth Canadian Armoured Brigade Headquarters Squadron outside town of Pignataro Maggiore, 
Italy. 10 May 1944. From a watercolour from L.P. Harris. (CWM no.l2717) 
formations, and for pursuit." 14 Mobility and 
fire-power made its mere presence a threat by 
forcing the enemy continually to alter his own 
dispositions in anticipation of the unexpected 
appearance on the battlefield of a large 
48 
envisaged by Liddell Hart and practised in 
blitzkrieg. 
There were precious few regions in the 
enclosed, obstacle ridden Italian countryside, 
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however, where standard doctrine might be 
applied. As the units of 7th Armoured Division 
found on arriving from North Mrica, "Gone 
forever were the days of free manoeuvre in the 
Desert, of fast movement from one flank to 
another .... Now, they had to drive down 
narrow roads with ditches on both sides until 
a burst of fire at the leading car revealed the 
enemy's position." 17 Rather than armoured 
formations being deployed in classic cavalry 
fashion as "the rapier in the hands of the 
higher commander, "18 ready to exploit initial 
success, tanks had to be employed primarily to 
supplement artillery fire in support of infantry, 
with units usually decentralized on a squadron/ 
troop basis with battalions and companies. As 
a formation, the armoured division in Italy was 
unbalanced; the force of its armour could 
seldom be concentrated, yet with only one 
infantry brigade it could not be fought like an 
ordinary infantry division. When employing 
5th CAD, consequently, Hoffmeister had 
continually to strike a pragmatic compromise 
between doctrinal theory and the realities of 
the ground over which he had to operate. In 
any case, the circumstances placed the highest 
premium on developing battle-tested drills for 
infantry /tank cooperation so the two arms 
could provide maximum mutual support. 
The theory of infantry-tank cooperation 
was simple enough to assert - tanks 
neutralized enemy wire and machine-guns 
while the infantry dealt with his mines and 
anti-tank guns- but its efficient practice was 
another matter. "The general conception of the 
attack is a mutual co-operative advance against 
the objective,"19 but ground and the tactical 
situation made each tactical problem unique. 
Whether tanks should lead or follow the 
infantry, and whether they might provide 
support by accompanying them or with 
supporting fire from a distance, were open 
questions which no established doctrine could 
answer conclusively. The two arms had to 
learn how to communicate with each other, 
however, for as one contemporary noted, "Apart 
from insufficient opportunity for preliminary 
co-operative training between infantry and 
tanks that are to operate together, the major 
obstacle to co-operation at the moment is the 
failure to achieve really satisfactory and reliable 
means of intercommunication between infantry 
and tanks in battle. "20 Or, as another Canadian 
armoured unit described the problem from 
below: 
In this country with tankvs tank or tank vs anti-tank 
gun, the attacker is at a disadvantage. It is therefore 
necessary to spot the anti-tank gun or tank first. 
This can only be done by the Troop Leader moving 
forward from fire position to fire position on foot. The 
enemy can be also spotted and destroyed by the 
tanks, aided by the infantry as "eyes." This condition 
only exists where a Squadron has been working and 
fighting for a considerable period of time, with the 
same regiment, commanded by a commander who 
thinks of and has a knowledge of tanks, and imbibes 
this spirit of co-operation and confidence into his 
Company commanders. 21 
Effective battlefield drills could only come 
through intensive integrated training, and when 
he turned over command of 5 CAB to J.D.B. 
Smith in February 1944, Brigadier G.R. 
Bradbrooke pointed to some serious deficiencies 
in the division's infantry-tank tactical practice. 
Both infantry and armoured commanders had 
confided to him their impressions of having 
been let down by the other. Their attitudes, he 
judged, had stemmed from mutual ignorance 
of the other's methods and capabilities. In the 
attack, infantry wanted tanks right with them 
and were extremely reluctant to move forward 
when the tanks became separated or were 
stopped; tankers complained that the infantry 
failed to appreciate the impossibility of their 
maintaining intimate contact while moving 
over broken ground and, moreover, that they 
could provide gun fire support just as effectively 
from long range. The infantry also wanted 
tanks with them in defence, especially in the 
period before their own anti-tank weapons got 
forward; tankers objected that the infantry 
were reluctant to give them close protection in 
forward positions at night when they were 
blind and most vulnerable. Both arms 
recognized the need for better target indication 
to enhance their mutual support. 22 
Divisional Headquarters delegated 5 CAB 
to study the problem and organize a training 
programmetomeetit. In February, the Brigade 
staff conducted a cloth model exercise and 
discussion for infantry and tank unit 
commanders, and followed in March with a 
series of TEWTs [Tactical Exercise Without 
Troops]. first for squadron/company 
49 
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commanders, then for Captains and subalterns 
in both the armoured and infantry brigades. 
These covered all phases of all-arms 
cooperation; communications (it was at this 
time that the tank -mounted infantry telephone 
was first tried); target indication; deployment 
drills, orders of march and battle procedure; 
how ground and the tactical situation would 
dictate when tanks and when the infantry 
should lead; use of supporting weapons and 
fire; night protection; mutual support; 
command and control. Theory was then put 
into practice when squadrons and companies 
were brought into common bivouacs, where 
they might familiarize themselves with the 
other arm's equipments, before moving through 
dry then live firing exercises with all weapons. 23 
A divisional exercise completed the cycle. 
Designed to train the headquarters and both 
brigades in deploying from a concentration 
area and mounting a set-piece attack, it gave 
particular stress to joint reconnaissance and 
planning, as well as staff drills for movement 
and traffic control, and passing information.24 
Unfortunately it was the only divisional level 
exercise as the concentrated training period 
was disrupted when 11 Brigade was detached 
for a month's tour in the line near Cassino, this 
time under New Zealand command. Five CAB 
and the other divisional units continued 
training, but it is impossible to gauge its 
effectiveness. As is usually the case, some 
units no doubt profited more from the 
opportunity than others. Moreover, the 
difficulties a new commander and staff faced in 
fusing an efficient fighting armoured division 
in difficult circumstances cannot be gainsaid. 
Nevertheless, by the time 11 Brigade returned 
to the fold early in May, the division was 
already preparing for its first action as a 
formation; an assault against the Gustav and 
Hitler Lines in the Liri River valley South-west 
of Rome. 
Eighth Army's front in the four-to-seven 
mile wide, east-west Liri Valley was dominated 
by Mount Cairo on the North (Monte Cassino is 
a spur) and the Aurunci range to the South. 
Through the northern side of the valley ran 
Highway 6, the main Naples-Rome road, and 
across the valley the Germans had constructed 
two very formidable defensive positions; the 
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Gustav Line situated at the eastern end and, 
further on, the Hitler Line. A number of Liri 
tributaries meandered across the front, all 
running against the grain of the advance, and 
forming serious natural obstacles which were 
thickened with minefields, pill boxes, dug in 
tank turrets, wire and machine-guns. General 
Leese's (who succeeded Montgomery at Eighth 
Army in December 1943) first objective was 
Cassino, a task he gave to the Polish Corps. 
Then, XIII Corps was to assault across the 
Rapido river at the base of Cassino, form a 
bridgehead which would breach the Gustav 
Line, and gain access to Highway 6. Initially 
held in reserve, the Canadian Corps had one of 
two tasks in the second phase; either to pass 
through the British and exploit along Highway 
6, or, if the defences did not fold, as seemed 
more likely, to take over the southern sector of 
XIII Corps' front and break through the Hitler 
Line. 
The offensive got underway on 11 May and 
it was soon apparent that there would be no 
easy bouncing of the defences. The Poles were 
unable to take Cassino quickly and on the 15th 
Leese ordered Burns into the Rapido 
bridgehead. Three tough days later the 1st 
Division closed on the outposts, mines and 
wire of the Hitler Line. Meanwhile, south of the 
Liri, General Juin's North Mrican mountain-
trained troops had made a spectacular advance 
through trackless mountain, raising the 
possibility they might outflank the Germans 
fronting the Canadians and force them to 
withdraw. The fleeting opportunity passed, 
however, and a two-day pause ensued while 
Burns moved his guns forward to support a full 
set-piece attack. He planned his assault, in 
conjunction with XIII Corps on his right, in two 
phases; General Vokes' 1st Division would first 
crack a hole in the Hitler Line position and the 
5th CAD would then break out through their 
gap and advance with all speed up the Liri 
Valley. 25 
Mter what was possibly its hardest ever 
day's fighting, on 23 May, 1st Division 
succeeded in gapping the Hitler Line defences. 
General Hoffmeister had set up his 
headquarters near Vokes' to follow the battle 
and next morning his lead units began passing 
through. He planned his attack in three phases 
8
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which followed closely the doctrine on the 
employment of armoured formations. First his 
armoured brigade would move through 1st 
Division, press forward quickly and seize a 
bridgehead over the next obstacle, the Melfa 
River, aboutsixmilesdistant. Then his infantry 
brigade would take the next six mile bound to 
the Liri River which it would bridge near the 
town of Ceprano (where Highway 6 crossed the 
Liri). Finally the armoured brigade would take 
over the advance, which with luck would turn 
into a pursuit before the Germans were able to 
recover. 
Five CAB, organized in three infantry-
supported battle groups, and lead by a 
Strathconas reconnaissance troop and a 
company of the Westminsters, reached the 
Melfa in mid -afternoon and fom1ed a bridgehead 
by nightfall. [See "Battle for the Melfa River" on 
page 33 for a full description of this action.] 
Eleven Brigade passed through the following 
morning and, although its movement stalled 
during the day, it was able to get patrols across 
the Liri into Ceprano during the night. It was 
a good beginning for the Canadian Corps and 
5th CAD. As one historian observed, after its 
first day of fighting as a formation, "The 
Canadian Corps was thus up to, and in one 
place over, the Melfa by the end of the day, and 
had every reason to be satisfied with their 
success. It was the first time that the 5 
(Canadian) Armoured Division had been 
employed in the classic breakthrough role in 
Mortars of I Canadian Corps firing at night, 6 April 1944. 
(Photo by C.E. Nye/NAC PA 116819) 
51 
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the Italian campaign." He added, however, 
that "Unfortunately, the position in the rear of 
Hoffmeister's division was not so flattering. "26 
Veterans of the action still speak in awe of 
the confusion of tangled traffic behind the 
fighting troops. The narrow five mile front 
heavily favoured the defenders. The Liri valley, 
hemmed in by mountains on both north and 
south, was crossed against the grain by 
successive rivers and defiles which were 
liberally laced with mines, wire and fixed 
weapons of all types. The only decent road in 
the sector, Highway 6 tucked against the base 
of Monte Cassino, was bitterly contested by the 
Germans, and blown bridges elsewhere further 
canalized traffic onto the few insubstantial dirt 
tracks. In this naturally congested area, Leese 
insisted on fighting his battle through two 
corps headquarters. Mter the 4th British and 
8th Indian Divisions had established their 
Rapido bridgehead, the 78th British Division 
was slipped through on Bums' right flank to 
secure Highway 6 and allow the 6th South 
MricanArmoured Division to conduct the main 
pursuit. Bums' deployment was thus severely 
restricted having to conform with XIII Corps' 
progress and too many formations were 
channelled into too small a space. When 
opposition slowed forward progress the rear 
telescoped. Moreover, when the 78th Division 
was delayed by tenacious German rearguards, 
their units either moved through the Canadian 
sector or the inter-corps boundary was adjusted 
to meet their needs. As a result, confusion 
followed. Infantry support weapons, tanks, 
bridging, guns and ammunition were blocked 
from moving forward as priorities on the already 
inadequate routes were continually and 
unexpectedly changed, while word of the 
changes filtered only slowly to troops and units 
on the move, all making for the same few 
bridges. 
Consequently the final pursuit phase of the 
operation was slower and less effective than 
the breakthrough. When 11 Brigade moved 
across the Melfa on 26 May, its own inexperience 
and the ravines which separated infantry from 
supporting tanks slowed its advance. They 
crossed the river against light opposition on 
the 27th, but then their first bridge collapsed 
and badly delayed the opening of a tank route. 
52 
By then the armour of both 5th CAD and 6th 
South Mrican Armoured Division were lined 
up waiting to cross. Brigadier Smith eventually 
moved by way of a 1st Division bridge further 
South and was able to join 11 Brigade to 
continue the advance on the 29th. Movement 
was still hampered by rugged terrain, however, 
which severely limited deployment and on the 
last day of May 1st Division assumed the lead 
until the Corps went into Army reserve on 4 
June. 
The Canadian Corps performed creditably 
in its first operation, breaking through a 
formidable defensive position and advancing 
40 miles over very difficult country admirably 
suited for delaying tactics. Yet recriminations 
emerged in the aftermath. Leese was criticized 
for his ponderous handling of the battle, and in 
tum he found fault with Bums for moving too 
slowly and failing to exercise full control of his 
battlefield. Some of his criticism was justified, 
as Burns acknowledged. It would have been 
unusual had an untried commander and staff, 
along with an untested armoured division, not 
experienced difficulties in its first operation, 
especially a major one like the assault on the 
Hitler Line. But Leese's strictures were 
overdrawn, ignoring as they did the 
responsibility of his own headquarters to 
manage the front on which he had deployed 
two corps. He nevertheless attempted to replace 
Burns with an experienced British commander 
and, when that failed, to break up the Canadian 
Corps. The plan was only dropped when Bums 
pointed out the political implications of such a 
move. Instead, within a few weeks the Corps 
was assigned a major role in breaking through 
the Adriatic sector to the next German defensive 
barrier, the Gothic Line, stretching across the 
Italian peninsula from Spezia on the west -to 
• Pesaro in the east. First. there was a period for 
recuperation to absorb reinforcements, as well 
as the reflection and training; "time to absorb 
the lessons which they had learned in the 
recent fighting. "27 
The Liri Valley fighting gave the Corps the 
incomparable training experience which only 
actual operations can provide, and there were 
many lessons to digest. All units and formations 
compiled impressively detailed after-action 
reports, including an analysis of "lessons 
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learned," which Corps Headquarters 
consolidated in two major papers; "The Set-
Piece Attack: Lessons from the Breakthrough 
of the Hitler Line," and "Lessons of the Pursuit 
from Melfa to Agnani." Early in June a full 
scale training conference for Lieutenant-
Colonels and above met to discuss tactics for 
the breakthrough and advance phases which 
could then be practised and rehearsed for the 
next operation. 28 
Fifth CAD concluded there were both 
tactical and organizational difficulties to correct. 
The divisional staff, for example had to modify 
its deployment drills. General Hoffmeister had 
fought his battle from a small, detached tactical 
headquarters (initially at least from a command 
tank, which he soon abandoned for a jeep), but 
it provided impractical to operate the 
headquarters effectively for more than a short 
period with a split staff. Wireless 
communications were unreliable (caused 
partially by the high density of formations and 
the consequent crowding of frequencies) and it 
had not been possible to manage the passage 
of information, up or down, during the fighting. 
This applied equally to the CRA's headquarters, 
which was undermanned in the best of 
circumstances. 
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The two principal organizational faults were 
a shortage of sappers and infantry. An 
armoured division had only two field squadrons 
on establishment, yet its need for bridging and 
mine clearing was proportionately greater than 
an infantry division's. A strong case was made 
for adding a third squadron, and this became 
tied to a proposal for adding a second infantry 
brigade. The need for additional infantry was 
made particularly clear during the advance 
from the Melfa when it proved impossible to 
maintain momentum with just one infantry 
brigade. There were too few troops either to 
thicken the front to an appropriate width for 
deploying armour, or to leapfrog brigades on a 
narrower frontage to speed forward movement. 
British armoured divisions in Italy began 
to receive more infantry, and Burns pressed 
Canadian headquarters in London for similar 
reinforcement. After considerable discussion, 
it was agreed, but with one major caveat; all the 
units for the new brigade had to be found 
within current Canadian Corps resources. 
Twelve Canadian Infantry Brigade thus came 
into existence on 13 July when General Burns 
informed Brigadier D.C. Spry that he would 
leave 1 CIB to take command of the new 
formation. 29 The Westminsters became its first 
battalion. The two others were converted from 
other units; the Princess Louise Dragoon 
Guards (PLDG) (1st Division reconnaissance 
regiment) was one, the 1st Canadian Light 
Anti-Aircraft Regiment, initially rebadged as 
the 89th/ 1 09th Battalion, then as the Lanark 
and Renfrew Scottish, the other. Additional 
artillery, engineer and service units were found 
among Corps troops. 
It was clearly going to be no easy task to 
form a new brigade headquarters and impose 
control over such an ad hoc grouping. There 
was little difficulty absorbing specialist troops, 
for instance, the AGRA's [Army Group Royal 
Artillery) 11th Field Regiment, but converting 
PLDG troopers and anti-aircraft gunners 
quickly to infantry did present problems. 
Training had to begin back at the individual 
level (tests of elementary training) before even 
section let alone company tactics could be 
practised or support weapons deployed. An 
experienced infanteer, Lieutenant-Colonel W.C. 
Dick moved from Brigade Major of 11 CIB to 
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command the Lanarks, but he can hardly have 
been encouraged when the brigade's first 
shipment of training pamphlets consisted of 
150 copies of one for the long-gone Lewis gun. 
Training, interrupted continually with 
inevitable moves and housekeeping, was, 
consequently, less than thorough. All units 
did field firing, and each PLDG squadron 
managed to complete a river crossing exercise 
before the divisional staff put the brigade itself 
through Exercise "Canyon," a simulated assault 
crossing against a defended river obstacle. 
This was done under a new commander, 
BrigadierJ .S. Lind (Spry having been promoted 
and sent to France). The following day, 18 
August, units received their movement 
instructions for Operation "Olive" - a full-scale 
attack against the Gothic Line. There was no 
more time for training; 5th Canadian Armoured 
Division was needed on the battlefield. 30 
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Coming in May! 
The Spring 1994 issue of CMH will mark the 50th Anniversary of 
Operation "Overlord" with a special section devoted to the Summer of 
1944. Join us for new perspectives on the Normandy campaign. 
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